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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Raymond Charles Marquez appeals from a jury verdict and final judgment 
entered by Judge Scott N. Johansen on July 10, 2006, in the Carbon County 
Seventh District Court. This Court has jurisdiction according to UTAH CODE 
ANN.§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Lexis 2007). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was Marquez's trial counsel ineffective for failing to request suppression 
of Marquez's search and pre-Miranda confession statements prior to trial, for 
failing to present any witnesses in Marquez's defense, and for failing to acquire 
important evidence prior to trial? 
a. Standard of Review: When a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 
is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the Court determines whether 
counsel was effective as a matter of law, with review being highly 
deferential in favor of counsel's performance. State v. Tennyson, 850 
P.2d 461, 466 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On January 5, 2006, Raymond Charles Marquez was charged with 
possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, and possession of a controlled 
substance and possession of a dangerous weapon by a Class I restricted person, 
both third degree felonies. (R.l). 
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At a jury trial on June 29, 2006, Marquez was convicted on all three counts 
and was immediately taken into custody pending sentencing. (R.52; Tr. 109). On 
July 19, 2006, the trial court entered its order sentencing Marquez to serve zero-to-
five year terms in prison on Counts I and II, and six months in the Carbon County 
Jail on Count III. (R.55). The court ordered that the sentences be served 
concurrently with each other and concurrently with a sentence in another case. Id, 
Defendant, acting pro se and through a purported attorney-in-fact, filed a 
Motion For New Trial on July 25, 2006, and a Notice of Appeal and Motion for 
Certificate of Probable Cause on July 26, 2007. (R.57, 62, 64). The trial court 
denied the motions for a new trial and for a certificate of probable cause on 
October 2, 2006. (R.90). 
An Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on August 8, 2006. (R.81). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 14, 2005, at approximately 10:15 p.m., Trooper Vasquez of the 
Utah Highway Patrol stopped Raymond Charles Marquez for a broken taillight. 
(Tr. 44). Marquez stopped his vehicle immediately upon being signaled by 
Vasquez to stop. Id. Marquez was the only occupant of the vehicle. (Tr. 45). 
Upon approaching the vehicle, Vasquez noticed a closed switchblade knife sitting 
on the front passenger's seat and also noticed another knife near Marquez's leg. 
(Tr. 45-46). Vasquez asked Marquez to exit the vehicle to separate him from the 
knives. (Tr. 46). Vasquez immediately began searching Marquez for weapons. 
(Tr. 46). During the search, Vasquez felt what he immediately suspected to be a 
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marijuana pipe in Marquez's pocket. (Tr. 12,47-48). Vasquez asked Marquez 
what the item was and what Marquez smoked with it. (Tr. 12, 48). Marquez 
responded that it was used to smoke his "weed." (Tr. 12, 48). No weapons were 
located on Marquez and no additional weapons were located in the vehicle. (Tr. 
49). Vasquez placed Marquez under arrest and searched the vehicle and 
Marquez's wallet, locating additional items of paraphernalia and meth residue. 
(Tr. 49-50). 
Prior to trial, trial counsel requested general discovery in the case, including 
videotapes. (Tr.7). Counsel did not separately seek to subpoena the videotape of 
the traffic stop and the videotape was not provided by the State as part of the 
discovery process. Trial counsel did not file any pretrial motions and attempted to 
present a motion to suppress evidence in the form of a motion in limine on the 
morning of trial. (Tr.5-14). The trial court determined the motion to be untimely. 
(Tr.14). Trial counsel then rested without presenting any witnesses in Marquez's 
defense. (Tr.77). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Marquez's trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to request 
suppression of the warrantless search and pre-Miranda confession in a timely 
manner. Trial counsel also failed to call or present any witnesses in Marquez's 
behalf and failed to adequately investigate all of the evidence in the case before 
Page 3 of 12 
trial. There is a reasonable probability that the outcome of Marquez's trial would 
have been different if counsel's performance had not been deficient. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE 
MARQUEZ'S TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, 
FAILED TO CALL WITNESSES IN MARQUEZ'S DEFENSE, AND 
FAILED TO INVESTIGATE AND ACQUIRE IMPORTANT 
EVIDENCE PRIOR TO TRIAL. 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Marquez must 
demonstrate that trial counsel's performance was so deficient that it fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and that "but for" counsel's deficient 
performance, there is a reasonable probability that the trial would have had a 
different outcome. Myers v. State, 94 P.3d 211, 216 (Utah 2004). Importantly, 
the Court indulges a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the 
wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. Finally, to bring an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Marquez must be represented by different 
counsel on appeal and the record must be adequate to permit decision of the issue. 
State v. Litherland, 12 P.3d 92, 96 (Utah 2000). 
1. The warrantless "weapons" search of Marquez was improper 
because Trooper Vasquez did not reasonably suspect that Marquez 
was armed or presently dangerous. 
To determine whether a warrantless search and seizure was reasonable, the 
trial court must evaluate the facts objectively and according to the totality of the 
circumstances. State v. Warren, 78 P.3d 590, 594 (Utah 2003). With respect to a 
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"Terry" or a "weapons" frisk, the police officer must be able to articulate specific 
facts to show that the intrusion was appropriate under the circumstances. Id. An 
officer may "perform a protective frisk pursuant to a lawful stop when the officer 
reasonably believes a person is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or [to] 
others." Id. Because traffic stops are inherently dangerous, that is part of the 
totality of the circumstances to be considered by a court when evaluating an 
officer's actions. Id. Despite the dangerousness of traffic stops, however, ordering 
a person out of a vehicle or conducting a background check may allow the officer 
to operate safely without unjustifiably intruding upon the rights of the individual. 
Id at 597. 
To justify a frisk, an officer must demonstrate "specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would lead a 
reasonable person to conclude that the suspect may be armed and presently 
dangerous." Id at 598 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24, (1968). 
In this case, Trooper Vasquez testified that the traffic stop was conducted at 
about 10:14 p.m. (Tr. 44). Marquez stopped the vehicle immediately and Vasquez 
determined that he was the sole occupant of the vehicle. (Tr. 44-45). Vasquez 
saw a switchblade-style knife with the blade closed, resting on the passenger seat 
in plain view and another knife that was also visible to Vasquez. (Tr. 45-46, 58). 
There was no apparent attempt by Marquez to hide the knives. Vasquez asked 
Marquez to get out of the car and immediately began searching him for weapons. 
(Tr. 46). No weapons were located on Marquez's person and no additional 
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weapons were located in the vehicle. (Tr. 49). Importantly, Vasquez had no 
historical contact with Marquez to raise any concerns that Marquez might be a 
risk. Vasquez stated that he had never had contact with Marquez and had no 
information about whether Marquez had a criminal history. (Tr. 58, 60). Marquez 
also appears to have been fully compliant throughout the encounter. 
Based on the sparse trial record, the search in this case does not appear to be 
justified under the circumstances. Vasquez did not articulate any specific facts at 
trial to demonstrate that, after Marquez was outside of the car, he still feared for 
his safety. Marquez did not act aggressively or make any furtive movement that 
was consistent with aggression or with retrieving a weapon. The time of night was 
not unusually late. The knives weren't concealed from view, even though one 
knife was slightly less visible to Vasquez than the other. Marquez was compliant 
during the stop and fully cooperated as requested. 
The only fact tending to justify Vasquez's frisk (from the trial record) is 
that there existed two knives in the car. The totality of all circumstances 
surrounding this stop, however, don't demonstrate that Vasquez considered 
Marquez to be a "presently dangerous" safety risk justifying a frisk. Also, there is 
no indication that removal from the vehicle would not have sufficiently removed 
Marquez from the knives and satisfied officer safety concerns. 
Unfortunately, none of this information or argument was presented to the 
trial court in an effort to suppress evidence acquired as a result of the illegal 
search. Some effort was made to suppress Marquez's pre-Miranda confession 
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during the search but the trial court ruled that the motion was untimely and was 
untimely without just cause. (Tr. 14). As a result, Trooper Vasquez was never 
adequately questioned about his concerns for officer safety or cross-examined to 
determine whether those concerns were reasonable under the circumstances. The 
record is inadequate to fully determine whether suppression is appropriate. 
However, the record does adequately demonstrate that trial counsel was 
ineffective. And if, as it appears from the sparse record, there are grounds to 
suppress the Terry search, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of trial 
would be very different and this matter should be remanded for a new trial and 
suppression hearing because of counsel's ineffectiveness. Marquez should not be 
held responsible to understand the legal complexities of presenting a trial and 
suppressing evidence and he received little assistance in this regard. 
2. Marquez's pre-Miranda confession that he possessed marijuana 
pariphernalia was a result of the illegal frisk and should be 
suppressed. 
For similar reasons as set forth above, counsel ineffectively represented 
Marquez at trial because efforts to suppress Marquez's confession were untimely 
and no articulated legal authority was presented to the trial court to assist in 
determining the issue. 
In a factually similar case, a defendant made certain statements to law 
enforcement prior to receiving a Miranda warning. State v. Bertoch, 2005 Ut. 
App. 68 (Not for official publication). In Bertoch, the defendant admitted to 
possessing a marijuana pipe and bag of marijuana after he was detained during a 
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routine traffic stop. Id. The Court determined that the damaged condition of 
defendant's automobile and smell of alcohol on his breath did not justify the frisk 
and the search was illegal. Id. Ultimately, because the statements, whether 
voluntary or not, were made during the course of an illegal search, the statements 
had to be suppressed. Id. 
In this case, trial counsel presented an untimely and unsupported 
suppression motion to the trial court for consideration. It was not within the range 
of "reasonable professional assistance" to deprive Marquez of his most plausible 
defense. Had trial counsel adequately researched and timely presented a 
suppression motion to the trial court referencing the illegality of the Terry frisk in 
this case, there is a reasonable probability that Marquez's admissions would have 
been suppressed and the outcome of trial would have been different. 
3. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce any 
evidence regarding the "dangerousness" of the weapons. 
A "dangerous weapon" for purposes of Marquez's conviction is defined as 
"any item that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death 
or serious bodily injury." UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-10-501(5) (Lexis 2007). 
Interestingly, a knife is not presumptively a "dangerous weapon." Id. Rather, four 
factors are provided by statute to determine if an item is a dangerous weapon. Id. 
Two apply in this case: i) the character of the instrument, object, or thing; and iv) 
the other lawful purposes for which the instrument, object, or thing may be used. 
Id. 
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It is apparent from the statutory language that this is a factually driven 
analysis. Nevertheless, trial counsel failed to call any witnesses to testify at the 
trial regarding this or any other matter. (Tr. 77-79). There was some discussion at 
trial regarding the possibility that these knives may have been used to cut shingles 
or packages but no testimony about whether Mr. Marquez was so employed or 
whether any individual had observed such a non-"dangerous" use. (Tr. 69-71). In 
fact, trial counsel rested Marquez's case without calling a single witness to present 
possible uses of the knives that were consistent with lawful possession. 
Given the fact-based analysis to determine if a knife or other item is a 
dangerous weapon, it was unsound trial strategy to assume that the State would be 
unable to meet its burden of proof under the circumstances of this case and to 
assume that no case presentation on behalf of Marquez was in his interest. Trial 
counsel's strategy appears to be centered on demonstrating that the State had failed 
to prove the elements of the crime through nothing more than cross-examination of 
the State's witnesses. For this particular charge, that approach was unsound. 
4. Trial counsel failed to properly investigate and prepare for trial by 
examining all possible evidence, including a videotape of the traffic 
stop. 
At the outset of the case, trial counsel requested, among other requests, 
"all...videotapes...which may be used in the prosecution" of the case. (R.7). It was 
apparent at trial that there was a videotape of this traffic stop and trial counsel had 
been informed on the morning of trial that such a tape existed. (R.55), Affidavit of 
Samuel S. Bailey (in support of Rule 23B Motion.) Prior to trial, counsel had not 
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sought to have the tape produced apart from the general discovery request filed on 
March 13, 2006. Furthermore, when advised that the tape existed on the morning 
of trial, counsel took no action to view the tape or to request a continuance to 
determine whether the tape contained information that might be necessary to an 
appropriate presentation of Marquez's case. 
Although not supported by the record, it is common practice for law 
enforcement to videotape traffic stops. Trial counsel should have known that the 
tape existed and would be important to an adequate presentation of Marquez's 
case. Even if used to simply verify the State's allegations and prepare appropriate 
defenses, the tape was necessary to Marquez's defense. 
Independently, each of the above deficiencies might not rise to the level of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the cumulative effect is to deprive 
Marquez of a fair trial. No witnesses were called when Marquez's defense to the 
dangerous weapons charge was highly fact-specific. The videotape, though 
perhaps not exculpatory, certainly needed to be viewed by trial counsel prior to 
presenting his case, particularly since Trooper Vasquez viewed the tape 
immediately prior to testifying. (R.55). Suppression motions were untimely 
presented to the court and disguised as motions in limine. 
In sum, trial counsel's performance was deficient and there is a 
reasonable probability, particularly with regard to the suppression and 
admissibility of evidence issues, that the outcome at trial would have been 
different if the case had been properly prepared and presented. 
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CONCLUSION 
Marquez respectfully requests that this Court remand for a new trial due 
to trial counsel's ineffective representation. 
^ 
SUBMITTED this T day of May, 2007. 
By:_ 
1. Tor^erson DonM. 
Attorney for the Appellant 
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As of May 07, 2007 
State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Travis Bertoch, Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 20030111-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2005 UTApp 68; 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 77 
February 17, 2005, Filed 
NOTICE: [*1] NOT FOR OFFICIAL 
PUBLICATION 
PRIOR HISTORY: Third Distnct, Salt Lake 
Department The Honorable Dennis M Fuchs 
State v Bertoch 2004 UT App 470 2004 Utah App 
LEXIS 528 (2004) 
DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded 
COUNSEL: Lon Seppi, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L Shurtleff and Chnstine Soltis, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
JUDGES: Norman H Jackson, Judge WE CONCUR 
James Z Davis, Judge, William A Thorne Jr, Judge 
OPINION BY: Norman H Jackson 
OPINION 
AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION l 
1 This Amended Memorandum Decision 
replaces the Memorandum Decision in Case No 
20030111-CA issued on December 16, 2004 
Footnote 1 of the onginal opinion has been 
deleted 
Before Judges Davis, Jackson, and Thorne 
JACKSON, Judge 
Travis Bertoch appeals the trial court's order denying 
his motion to suppress as evidence a pipe and a plastic 
bag of marijuana obtained by police during a traffic stop, 
as well as certain statements he made at the scene He 
claims police discovered this evidence after an illegal 
frisk and that his statements were made pnor to receiving 
a Miranda warning The trial court ruled that the pipe and 
[*2] marijuana were admissible as part of a search 
incident to arrest and that his statements were made 
dunng a noncustodial police interview Upon this 
determination, Bertoch entered a conditional guilty plea 
to possession of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony We reverse the trial court's denial of Bertoch's 
motion to suppress 
"When a case involves the reasonableness of a search 
and seizure, we afford little discretion to the district court 
because there must be state-wide standards that guide law 
enforcement and prosecutonal officials'" State v 
Warren 2003 UT 36 P 12 78 P 3d 590 (quoting State v 
Hansen 2002 UT 125 P 26 63 P 3d 650) '"In reviewing 
the trial court's denial of [a defendant's] motion to 
suppress, we examine the underlying factual findings for 
clear error, and review the trial court's conclusions of law 
based thereon for correctness "' State v Allred 2002 UT 
App 291 P8 55 P 3d 1158 (citation omitted) 
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2005 UT App 68, 2005 Utah App LEXIS 77, *2 
First, Bertoch argues that the pipe and manjuana 
discovered during the highway patrol trooper's initial 
fnsk should be suppressed because, as Bertoch contends, 
the trooper lacked a reasonable [*3] belief that Bertoch 
was armed and dangerous We agree that the frisk was 
improper A police officer "may perform a protective 
fnsk pursuant to a lawful stop when the officer 
reasonably believes a person is armed and presently 
dangerous to the officer or [to] others '" Warren, 2003 UT 
36 at P 13 (quoting Terry v Ohio 392 US 1, 24, 20 L 
Ed 2d 889 88 S Ct 1868 (1968)) "In determining 
reasonableness, due weight must be given, not to [an 
officers'] inchoate and unparticulanzed suspicion or 
"hunch," but to specific reasonable inferences which [an 
officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his 
experience "' Id at P 14 (quoting Terry, 392 US at 27) 
(alterations in onginal) Here, the trooper's suspicion that 
the missing trunk lid and misplaced license plate 
indicated the car may have been stolen does not provide 
sufficient grounds to perform a fnsk 
The tnal court denied the motion to suppress, 
holding that the evidence was obtained as part of a search 
incident to arrest Although a police officer may perform 
a search incident to arrest even before a suspect is 
formally arrested, the officer must have "probable cause 
[*4] to believe that the suspect has committed or is 
committing an offense'" State v Trane, 2002 UT 97, P 
26, 57 P 3d 1052 (quoting Michigan v DeFilhppo, 443 
US 31, 36, 61 L Ed 2d 343, 99 S Ct 2627 (1979)) At 
the time of the frisk in this case, the smell of alcohol on 
Bertoch's breath and the condition of his automobile 
could not provide the trooper with probable cause to 
arrest him 
Although the State indicates that the doctrine of 
"inevitable discovery" may apply to admit the pipe and 
manjuana, we may only affirm on such alternative 
grounds if they are "apparent on the record" and 
sustained by the trial court's factual findings State v 
Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, P9 76 P 3d 1159 Here, the tnal 
court made its ruling from the bench and included only 
cursory factual findings Given this limited information, 
we can neither affirm on alternative grounds nor conclude 
with certainty that the items would have been discovered 
independently of the illegal fnsk 
Second, the tnal court denied Bertoch's motion to 
suppress his pre-Miranda statements Specifically, 
Bertoch seeks to suppress his admission, which was made 
dunng the frisk, that he had marijuana in [*5] his pocket 
and had smoked manjuana the night before It is clear 
that such an admission may be suppressed if it was 
obtained by means of police illegality "In determining 
the validity of a confession or incnminating statements 
following police illegality, two inquiries must be made 
First, the court must determine whether the 
confession was voluntary, [and] second, the court must 
determine whether the confession was obtained in the 
course of police exploitation of the pnor illegality " State 
v Allen, 839 P 2d 291, 300 (Utah 1992) In considenng 
the degree to which a confession is derived from police 
exploitation of a prior illegality, the court should consider 
"[(1)] whether Miranda warnings were given, [(2)] the 
temporal proximity of the illegality and the confession, 
[(3)] the absence or presence of intervening 
circumstances, and [(4)] the purpose and flagrancy of the 
official misconduct " Id at 301 Here, Bertoch made the 
statements dunng the course of the fnsk and in response 
to what the officer found dunng the fnsk Regardless of 
whether Bertoch's statements were voluntary, they were 
made as a direct result [*6] of the illegal fnsk and must 
be suppressed 
In sum, we conclude that the trooper's frisk was 
illegal and, as such, the pipe, manjuana, and Bertoch's 
pre-Miranda statements regarding them must be 
suppressed Accordingly, we reverse the tnal court's 
denial of Bertoch's motion to suppress with regard to the 
pipe, manjuana, and related statements and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this decision and 
Bertoch's conditional guilty plea 
Norman H Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR 
James Z Davis, Judge 
William A Thorne Jr , Judge 
